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NOTES

SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE FORUM: BRIDGING THE GAP
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
CarlN. Pickerill*

INTRODUCTION

What if antitrust litigants could, instead of litigating their cases
before federal courts of limited expertise, litigate them before a hallof-fame antitrust panel composed of Richard Posner,' Robert Pitovsky, 2 and Herbert Hovenkamp? 3 What if, instead of plaintiffs relying
on lay juries for an answer about whether they were harmed in a mass
toxic tort case, the plaintiffs could rely on the word of the best scientists in the field? What if aggrieved shareholders, instead of bringing
their derivative lawsuits before an attorney-gamesmanship-susceptible
mishmash of juries and judges, could turn to an expert tribunal of
economists and brokers? These kinds of trials seem as desirable in
theory as they are impossible in practice. Or are they?
Countless scholars have noted the ascension of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the modern legal world as a way to achieve
*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A. Sociology,

University of Chicago, 2005. Many thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his guidance

and suggestions throughout the writing and researching of this Note. I owe a debt of
gratitude as well to Executive Notes Editor G. David Mathues for the fruitful
discussion of note topics with him over the summer and throughout the year. And I
would like to thank the entire Law Review staff for their substantive and editing
contributions to the Note. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Emily for
the support she has given me throughout law school,
1 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw (2d ed. 2001).
2

3

See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION (5th ed. 2003).
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005).
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such specialized adjudication. 4 ADR's obvious benefits-efficiency,
adjudication by an expert, and cost-effectiveness-have buoyed its use.
Yet other scholars decry it a thing that undermines the traditionally
judge-driven development of the common law. 5 Arbitration's inability
to create precedent and its inconsistent results makes some question
its legitimacy. 6 On the other hand, practitioners, corporations, and
some legal scholars remain suspicious ofjudges' and juries' abilities to
"get it right" in highly technical cases. 7 Additionally, the docket burden on federal courts ensures a lengthy trial process, especially for
technical cases, further encouraging litigants to choose arbitration."
4 Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?,
18 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93, 108-14 (2002) (discussing the effectiveness of and
public satisfaction and dissatisfaction with ADR); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (disparaging the rise in arbitrated settlements between
otherwise litigious parties); Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory
ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civilfustice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 952 (2000)
(noting the "arrival of alternative dispute resolution.., onto the modem legal landscape"). One recent study, however, disputes the very "ascension" of ADR that so
many other scholars both revere and decry. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flightfrom Arbitration:An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in
Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts 2, 19, 21 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper
Series No. 06-023, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423 (finding that
of 2,800 contracts filed by publicly-held companies with the SEC, only eleven percent
contained arbitration clauses; pooling servicing agreements and trust agreements
almost never included arbitration agreements, while employment agreements (thirtyseven percent] and licensing agreements (forty-eight percent] had a somewhat
higher incidence of arbitration clauses).
5 Compare Tom Arnold, Why ADR, 619 PLI/PAT 1031, 1043-54 (2000) (noting
the benefits of ADR in litigation involving complex matters), with Rex R.
Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (2004)
(arguing that both legislatively and judicially created legal rules have a prescriptive
role and that arbitrations and settlements result in fewer decided cases and an erosion
of legal precedent).
6 See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 4, at 983-85 ("ADR has not yet earned its legitimacy as a fair and impartial means of dispute resolution .... CT] here are fewer rules
to define the terms of the debate. .. ").
7 See Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 205-06 (1976) (decrying the gamesmanship and the nuisance of
settlements that often drive litigants away from the courtroom into arbitration).
8 See Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96,
99-100 (1976); see also Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal
Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 109-27 (2006) (arguing that the current
Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have created an untenable situation for
district courts by expanding jurisdiction while limiting trial judge discretion). Sherry
argues quite persuasively that the Supreme Court and appellate courts have expanded
federal jurisdiction through abrogation of state sovereign immunity and loosening of
supplemental jurisdiction, standing, and federal court intervention rules, while stripping trial court judges of discretion not to hear certain state claims. Id. 109-23.
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What is the solution to the discontent inherent in both private
and public adjudication? 9 Private ADR cannot provide the solution
because it guts public common law. Public law cannot provide the
solution because of its lack of expertise, costs, and inefficiencies.
Instead, Congress should create a hybrid system similar to modern
administrative courts. 10 Such a system should be, and could be, a
streamlined, constitutionally-acceptable process where panels of

After enunciating an Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity doctrine in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court proceeded to abrogate that
immunity in a trio of cases. See Sherry, supra, at 111-13 (discussing Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 994 (2006) (holding that states do not have
immunity from bankruptcy proceedings), Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-34
(2004) (upholding the Americans with Disabilities Act, banning disability discrimination in public accommodations), Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 728-40 (2003) (upholding Congress's enactment of the Family Medical
Leave Act, requiring state employers to provide unpaid leave for employees caring for
an ill family member)). Likewise, the Court backed away from its holding in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (requiring a federal
cause of action for federal question jurisdiction), by ruling in Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005), that a
state cause of action raising a federal issue may be subject to federal jurisdiction. See
Sherry, supra, at 115-16. Simultaneously, many appellate courts have interpreted the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), to limit trial judge
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Sherry, supra,at 125. The result
has been to burden federal dockets with cases, in which disputing jurisdiction has
become the main event. This fact, along with the highly technical nature of business
litigation, helps explain why so many of these cases eventually find their way into
arbitration and other forms of ADR.
9 Obviously there is no one solution to the "discontent." For a discussion of
other proposed solutions to the private-public law divide see infra note 11 and accompanying text
10 Some have opined that legislative courts and administrative courts are distinct.
See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 360
(1991) (advocating for a specialized court to review administrative agency action). I
concur with that statement; it is well established that the Tax Court-an Article I
legislative court-operates differently from an administrative law court. Compare 26
U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7453 (2000) (establishing the Tax Court and providing for use of
Federal Rules of Evidence), and TAX CT. R. PRAc. & P. 1 (a) (permitting rulemaking
through notice and comment to the public only for Tax Court procedure), with 5
U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (2000) (permitting liberal use of evidence rules; permitting agency
rulemaking and adjudication affecting both substantive and procedural rights). However, because this Note asks whether Congress can and should legislate a hybrid specialty court system, and because both Tax Courts and administrative courts arestrictly speaking-legislated entities, I will treat both the same and focus exclusively on
the operation of administrative courts.
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experts in administrative agencies serve as factfinders in their respective fields.II
The goal is some middle ground between generalist renaissance
judges and institutionally illegitimate arbitrators and the hope is that
our aforementioned antitrust dream team and similar expert panels
would ultimately occupy that middle ground. However, an additional
hope is that this antitrust dream team would not only serve ADR par11 Administrative courts are not the only solution to the public court/private
court dichotomy. Other solutions propose: 1) using specialized state business courts,
similar to the Delaware Court of Chancery; 2) combining the systems of ADR and
public law; and 3) creating a national expert appeals court to hear claims directly
from administrative agencies. For a discussion proposing the use of specialized state
courts see Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DA E L. REv. 513, 580
(2006) (suggesting that a merger of traditional and alternative forums of adjudication
could take the form of "specialized courts, akin to Delaware's Chancery Court"); see
also DEL. CONsT. art. IV, § 10 (establishing the Delaware Court of Chancery to hear
cases arising under the laws of incorporation). The Chancery Court in particular and
specialized business courts in general have received much attention due to their capability of providing expert adjudicators in complex cases. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61
BRooK. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995) (comparing Delaware's Court of Chancery to other
specialized business tribunals and noting a "trend toward adjudicating business disputes in a specialized tribunal"). But see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 725-26 (2002) (arguing that
political realities prevent state legislators from establishing business courts and a rulebased business code that would allow them to compete with Delaware for incorporations and also noting the relative ease in establishing such courts). The point of contention surrounding specialized state courts would be Congress's power to not only
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain specialized cases, but to mandate
the creation of specialized courts at the state level. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362, 1363-66 (1953); see also AnthonyJ. Bellia,Jr., CongressionalPower and State Court
Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 950-51 (2006) (looking at federal regulation of state
court jurisdiction and showing that under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947),
Congress can force states to enforce a federal action if it has "jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate [the] action" (citing id. at
394)). For a discussion proposing a "unification" of ADR and public courts by importing more procedural safeguards and reasoned opinions into arbitration see Reuben,
supra note 4, at 1046-86 (suggesting a unification of "trial and some of what is now
called private ADR into a single system of interrelated dispute resolution processes...
preserv[ing] the virtues of the various ADR processes while acknowledging their minimal but meaningful constitutional limits"). For a discussion of national expert
appeals court proposals see Bruff, supra note 10, at 360 (arguing for "a semi-specialized legislative court sitting nationwide to review both high-volume, fact-intensive
agency adjudications, and some other programs that . . . need specialization") and
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA.
L. Riv. 1111, 1115, 1166-67 (1990) (arguing for "review of administrative action in
specialized courts" and that such courts should also possess fact-finding functions).
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ticipants by offering expert adjudication, but would also serve the public by developing the common law by providing a source of reasoned
opinions and consistent results that current ADR does not provide.
Part I looks more closely at the criticisms leveled at both public
and private adjudication; by seeing the problems in each system we
can better see what we need in a new system of administrative courts.
Parts II through IV are organized in accordance with the most important principles that this system must vindicate: Part II considers the
principles of institutional legitimacy and precedential value that scholars claim is lacking from private ADR; Part III looks at the principles
of efficiency and expertise that other scholars claim is lacking from
public courts; Part IV looks at principles of constitutionality-Article
III restrictions and the Seventh Amendment.12 The conclusion will
propose a system of specialized administrative courts in specialized
fields having all the desirable attributes of current forums of adjudication (legitimacy, precedent, expertise, and efficiency), avoiding their
undesirable attributes (inconsistency, illegitimacy, cost, nonexpertise), and conforming with constitutional standards.
I.

INSUFFICIENT AND UNSATISFYING: GRIPES ABOUT
CURRENT FORMS OF ADJUDICATION

A.

Complaints About the Judicial System

Dissatisfaction with the federal judiciary is hardly a new phenomenon.," Adjudication by nature lends itself to the resolution of individual problems and individual disputes. Consequently, no individual
litigant is willing to compromise the thoroughness of procedure in the
name of efficiency. However, litigants also have an interest in resolving their disputes expeditiously. So while they may demand a process
that strives to get things right on the merits, other concerns prevail.
One of those is efficiency.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 Many of the procedural alterations to federal adjudication owe their development to criticism that Roscoe Pound leveled at the federal courts at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Although his criticisms-which decried the courts' slavish
adherence to procedural technicality over substance-find only marginal comparison
with the criticisms made by ADR proponents today, they compose part of a general
discontent with the federal judiciary. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395, 414 (1906), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 289 (1964) (bemoaning the time wasted and justice undelivered by virtue
ofjudges' insistence upon technical and procedural purity). For a comparison of the
challenges that faced Pound's legal world and the structural instabilities of our present system of adjudication, see Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 513-17.
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just over thirty years ago, the Judicial Conference of the United
States addressed multiple concerns confronting the federal judiciary,
including its inefficiencies. 1 4 Their conference, whose title-"Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice" (commonly known as the Pound Conference)-echoed the turn-of-the-century complaints of Roscoe Pound, provided a blueprint for reforming
the judiciary by supplementing it with ADR. In his keynote address,
then ChiefJustice Warren Burger spoke of "the design of some neweven radically new-'vehicles' to take [the judiciary] where [it]
want[ed] to go in the years ahead." 1 5 Burger's comments, which forecasted the soon-to-follow ADR explosion, read more like an admonition than a well-defined proposal for new organizational legislation.
Their instructive value, however, lies in their suggestions for change.
Burger's demands stem mainly from a concern with efficiency. His
outline of the "most satisfactory, the speediest and the least expensive
means" 16 of adjudication included proposals for: flexible and informal
small claims courts; 17 "well-developed forms of arbitration;"1 8 and
forums where personal injury cases don't "take years to complete." 19
Although Burger didn't couch his demands in the most eloquent
of prose, adherents to his ideas were no less vocal. Other speakers at
the conference blamed judicial ineffectiveness, backlogged dockets,
and pre-trial discovery for the courts' inefficiencies. 20 One speaker
satirized the plight of judges, who, unable to examine the "million [s]
of documents" that crop up during discovery, ultimately decide to
"giv[e] plaintiffs access to all of defendant's files and records, relevant
and irrelevant." 2' Aside from constituting a blatant invasion of privacy, such a description raises the specter of cases unresolved for years
and provides impetus for turning away from the courts.
14 Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) [hereinafter
Pound Conference].

15 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address at the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of justice: Agenda
for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 85

(1976).
16 Id. at 93.
17 Id. at 94; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules ....shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
18

Burger, supra note 15, at 94.

19

Id. at 95.

20
21

See Kirkham, supra note 7, at 203; Rifkind, supra note 8, at 99-100.
Kirkham, supra note 7, at 203.
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The strongest critics at the 1976 Pound Conference harped upon
the federal judiciary's inability to handle complex cases. 22 The parade
of horribles trotted before the Conference included a case involving
hundreds of witnesses,2 3 a case where a jury sat for eleven months 24
and cases involving dozens of lawyers and dozens of defendants. 25 A
simple Westlaw search according to firm or attorney demonstrates
2 6 Most
that such convoluted arrangements are hardly the exception.
notable among these criticisms of federal adjudication, however, were
criticisms of the way the public seemed to view judges as omniscient
and of the inability of juries to comprehend legal issues in civil litigation.2 7 The critics doubted not only a 'jack[]-of-all trades" 28 judge's
ability to provide solutions to every legal problem, but judges' abilities
to even explain such complex legal matters to juries who lacked the
29
"interest or attention necessary" to understand them.

22 Id. at 208; Rifkind, supra note 8, at 103-04.
23 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 108 (citing United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) in which the "government announced it would call 100 witnesses, and IBM said
it would call 400" in a trial that the judge promised would take one year to try and one
year to decide).
24 Id. at 108 (citing United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1963)). The
author cynically asked whether such process actually "constitute[d) a trial." Id.
25 Id. at 108 n.13 (citing United States v. Ark. Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Gas.
(CCH) 69,619 (N.D. Okla. 1960) (involving a case in which 84 lawyers represented
the defendant)); see also United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(commencing upon a complaint which named 63 defendants).
26 For example, a Westlaw search conducted on December 1, 2006 in the "All
Federal Cases" database (ALLFEDS) using the terms "at(Skadden & Kirkland &
Sidley)" yielded seven results. The first result was Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430
(4th Cir. 2005), a case in which eighteen plaintiffs and fifty-three defendants were
represented by fifty-one lawyers in a tort action involving telephone radio transmissions. The second result, Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir.
2001), while having only ten litigants, featured fifty lawyers in a health care fraud case.
This is not meant to be scientific; it serves only as an illustration of the complexity of
the cases and the extensive participation of the litigants.
27 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 208.
28 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 98; see also id. at 110 (stating that the complexity of
such fields of law as antitrust and securities overburdens the courts, whose subsequent
inconsistent decisions "make[] the law less certain" and "lessen[] respect for both the
courts and the law").
29 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 208; see also id. at 200-01 (expressing fear of judicial
and jury determination of "suit[s] affecting millions of stockholders, hundreds of
thousands of employees, pension and trust funds, banks and lending institutions,"
and suggesting that courts' interpretations of an "unreasonable restraint of trade" for
purposes of the Sherman Act would be akin to a legislature's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause).
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The Pound Conference's criticisms and Burger's suggested solutions have found reception both among judges and-perhaps more
obviously-among legal practitioners. Practitioners and litigants have
deserted the federal courts for private litigation in ever increasing
numbers.3 0 In addition, both Congress and the federal judiciary itself
have taken Burger's admonitions to heart. Congress passed the Civil
Justice Reform Act (CJRA) 3 1 in 1990, requiring five experimental district courts to adopt ADR methods to "reduc[e] cost and delay in civil
litigation." 32 After the CJRA was allowed to sunset in 1997, Congress
enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) 3 3 in 1998,
requiring every federal district court to make ADR available to
34

litigants.

Likewise, the federal judiciary has renewed its concerns with overloaded dockets and inefficiency expressed at the Pound Conference.
Notions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness underlay the Judicial Conference's Long Range Plan of 1995, which "encourage[d] each federal court to expand the scope and availability of alternative methods
of dispute resolution," noting the difficulty of "receiv[ing] early and
3
firm trial dates." -

'

The Plan's concern with efficiency goals translated into a series of
110 recommendations and 77 suggested implementation strategies. 6
Although the Long Range Plan generally advised Congress not to
enlarge federal jurisdiction, one specific recommendation hinted at
30 Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:Systematizing Corporate Use of ADt9 59
ALE. L. Rxv. 847, 848-58 (2004) (tracing the expanded use of ADR in the business
world); Alan W. Kowalchyk, Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes Outside of Court: Using
ADR to Take Control of Your Case, 61 Disp. RESOL. J., May-July 2006, at 28, 30 (noting the
attraction of using ADR to resolve intellectual property disputes because it is "less
costly and faster ...less formal than litigation, it allows for less discovery, judicial
rules of evidence do not apply"); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "LitigationLite": Procedural
and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289,
1300-01 (1998) (surveying the vast possibilities for ADR forums, including a litany of
special court-annexed ADR codifications for disputes involving forestry practices, public school bus routes, surface water rights, and earthquake insurance, among other
things). But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 2, 19-21 (arguing that litigants in
certain fields have begun to shun ADR).
31 Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000)).
32 Id. § 104(b) (2), 104 Stat. at 5097.
33 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4659 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000)).
34 Id.
35

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS

134 (1995) [hereinafter
36 Id. at 21-144.

CONF. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING].
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another potential source of dissatisfaction among litigants: judicial
37
expertise.
Criticisms of the absence of judicial expertise have produced predictable results. Increasingly, for litigants who don't want to subject
themselves to the capriciousness of a sympathetic jury or nonexpert
judge, the allure of arbitration is too good to pass up.38 In forums
where "parties can select a decision maker with expertise" 39 and avoid
"an unsophisticated, uninformed jury,"40 the risks of watching an
untrained or insufficiently attentive decisionmaker misconceive the
complex scientific or economic issues in one's case are reduced.
The sheer burden of these cases and the sheer volume of matters
tried and pending before the courts is also an area of concern for
litigants. In addition to the transactional costs that deter litigants
from entering the federal courts, judges' bursting dockets deter the
judges themselves from wanting to take additional cases. Both the
1976 Pound Conference and the 1995 Long Range Plan made overtures to the unwieldy state of federal dockets. While the 1976 Pound
Conference looked to ADR as the judiciary's savior, the Long Range
Plan admonished Congress to shrink jurisdiction, while continuing
Burger's call to increase the use of ADR. 41 Judith Resnik summarized
the consensus within the federal judiciary as follows: "Don't expand
the life-tenured ranks .... Rely ... on delegation . . .of non life-

tenured federal judges, as well as [on] devolution to the states or
retrenchment on access to federal courts ... 42
37 Id. at 109-10 (advocating for more extensive "education and training" for
judges and noting that the "[slocial, technological and demographic changes will
require a higher level of judicial competence").
38 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient
Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAw. 947, 947 (1997) (noting the concerns of the business and legal

community "regarding the efficiency, predictability, experience, and knowledge of
courts with respect to complex corporate and commercial disputes"); Cronin-Harris,
supra note 30, at 873.
39 Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30, 33 (noting that in some IP mediations, a team
of mediators may be used, each of whom possess expertise in the different issues that
arise in the mediation).
40 Arnold, supra note 5, at 1049 (describing judges as "the luck of the draw
among friends of Senators" who are "without sophisticated patent, technology, copyright and business experience and are overworked").
41 CONF. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 35, at 23-39.
42 Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEo. L.J. 2589, 2610 (1998). Resnik has also noted
Congress's enthusiasm for creating new substantive rights, which would seem to place
Congress's objectives in the area of federal causes of action in direct conflict with
both the objectives of the federal judiciary and the goals of the CJRA and the ADR
Act. SeeJudith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes HisJustice": Inventing the FederalDistrict
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There exists agreement among litigants, Congress, and the federal courts that something must be done about the unwieldy nature,
inefficiency, and nonexpertise of federal adjudication. Up until now,
the answer to that question has been to transfer decisionmaking
responsibilities to private arbitrators and mediators. While these
forums offer significant advantages-such as expertise and efficiency-many commentators point out their drawbacks.
B. ADR and its Discontents
The inefficiencies and nonexpertise of the federal courts deter
litigants from using them to resolve their disputes. In recent years,
they have filled that void by turning to alternative forums. Private
ADR, although hardly novel,4 3 provides litigants with that alternative
forum.
ADR exists in a variety of forms. While in arbitrationsa neutral
party selected by the litigants determines the legal issues in dispute,
mediation involves a neutral third party lacking the power to impose a
solution. 4 4 Arbitrators can conduct the proceedings according to the
manner in which the litigants customize them. Correspondingly, the
arbitrations can be "less formal, faster, and less expensive than the
judicial process." 4 5 Arbitrations can be either binding or nonbinding,
upon which the litigants must agree before hand.
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607,
649 (2002) (noting the "474 new causes of action" created by Congress between 1974
and 1998). On the other hand, the current twenty-first century Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to expand federal jurisdiction while decreasing the discretion
exercised by district courtjudges. See Sherry, supra note 8, at 98, 127 (arguing that
appellate judges have ignored the rigors of trial court litigation in enunciating "fuzzy
rules on jurisdictional questions and clear rules limiting trial court discretion" which
has produced disputes over jurisdiction rather than the merits of cases).
43 See Sabatino, supra note 30, at 1297 ("Commercial arbitration has been practiced for centuries and statutorily authorized for decades." (footnote omitted)).
44 THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 194-97 (2004) (citing LEONARD
RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LA:wYERS 2-6 (abr. 2d ed.
1998)).
45 Id. at 194. The verdict is still out on whether ADR truly is faster and less expensive. CompareJAMES S. KAALiR ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CML JUSTICE REFORM ACT 4 (1996) (finding "no strong

statistical evidence that time to disposition, litigation costs, or... satisfaction with case
management were significantly affected, either positively or negatively" by the use of
ADR), with DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 215 (1997)
(finding a twenty-eight percent improvement on the median age of cases at termination for cases in the Western District of Missouri required to participate in an ADR
program, compared with those not permitted to participate).
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Mediation consists only of negotiations in which a mediator seeks
to reach a result suitable to both parties. 46 Other forms of ADR combine arbitration and mediation in different ways, again, according to
prior agreement by the litigants. Mini-trials and summary jury trials
allow attorneys to present their cases before an advisory group, and in
some cases ajury, who then provide feedback on the relative merits of
each case. 47 One further variant is early neutralevaluationwhere a neutral party identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the litigants' cases
in an effort to compel settlement. 48 Furthermore, Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits defendants to tender offers of
49
settlement to plaintiffs before trial.
Congress has also helped shape ADR, enacting two statutes to
promote its use. 50 The first-the aforementioned CJRA 5 1-required

certain pilot federal districts to refer "appropriate cases to [ADRI programs" and offer nonbinding early neutral evaluation programs where
litigants present their cases to a neutral party. 52 It involved a limited
number of federal district courts for a limited number of years. The
second-the aforementioned ADR Act, 53 which essentially replaced

the CJRA after it expired in 1997-requires every federal district to
implement an ADR plan for use in all civil actions.5 4 District judges
may refer cases to arbitration, where decisions are then entered as the
judgment of the court if a party to the arbitration fails to file a written
demand for a trial de novo following the arbitration. 55
Litigants bear the costs of the arbitrator. Although ADR proponents argue that these costs are more than offset by the brevity of the
proceedings, 56 ADR's detractors cite the exorbitant fees that arbitra46

KAKALIK ET AL., SUpra

47

Id.

note 45, at 196.

48 Id.
49 FED. R. Crv. P. 68.
50 Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000). The
CJRA, although technically still on the books, was allowed to sunset in 1997. The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000),
quickly took its place, however, requiring "[e] ach ... district court [to] authorize...

the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions." Id. § 651(b).
51 See supranotes 31-34 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Civil
Justice Reform Act in its historical context.
52 KAKALiK ET AL., supra note 45, at 2 (citing Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 473(a), (b)).
53 See supra note 31-34 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act in its historical context.
54 28 U.S.C. § 651(b).

55

Id. §§ 657(a), (c).

56

Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30.
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of a system of "second
7
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can avoid [courts] by buying
class justice" in which "the better-off of a gated community. ' 58
counterpart
their way into the litigation
Judge Wayne Brazil,
Its proponents recognize this opposition.
the "second class justice" concern
for example, acknowledged both
rates of cases that are actually termiand the concern about falling
59 Although Brazil advocates adding ADR
nated during or after a trial.
cautions against "assess[ing] ADR
services to the federal courts, he
he cites reports in
program value with myopic self-congratulation"; that while 47% of
showing
the Northern District of California
ADR processes, only 22% of
of
effectiveness
mediators believed the
60
parties felt similarly.
Most bemoan not only its
ADR's critics are even more scathing.
fedto remove important cases from
ineffectiveness, but its tendency
Fiss's 1984 article, for example,
eral jurisdiction. Professor Owen
served only to avoid controversy,
claimed that encouraging settlement
of cases important to sociwhich correspondingly avoided resolution
that contractually-compelled arbiety. 6' Other commentators claim
class
types of cases-like consumer
6 2 And still
tration will soon place particular
of the federal courts.
actions-outside the jurisdiction
outside of federal jurisdiction-while
others say that taking such cases
to a resolution-doesn't
bringing costly and protracted litigation
F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 2002).
57 In reAtlantic Pipe Corp., 304
at 215.
58 RowE ET AL., supra note 44,
of cases
a study finding that the percentage
(citing
59 Brazil, supra note 4, at 125
terminacase
civil
all
of
2.2%
to
from 4.3%
terminated during or after trial decreased
2000).
and
tions between 1990
60 Id. at 146-47.
import of
illustrates quite vividly the societal
61 Fiss, supra note 4, at 1076. Fiss
of
litigants
corporate
involving
cases
such issues by distinguishing uncontroversial as "astruggle between a member of a
such
equal bargaining strength with scenarios
or a claim
department over alleged brutality,
police
municipal
a
and
minority
racial
Id.
injuries."
over work-related
by a worker against a large corporation
of the
The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
Liability:
62 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of
use
in
rise
the
that
(arguing
373, 375-76 (2005)
Modern Class Action, 104 MtcH. L. REv.
the
in
only
not
actions
class
prevents consumer
of contractual class action waivers
see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
on
federal courts, but in arbitrations as well);
and binding a forum clause placed
valid
499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (holding
inabilplaintiffs'
despite
consent to the clause
already-purchased tickets, and finding
had been made). Presumably, after
purchase
the
after
until
ity to view the tickets
or a class action
could always compel arbitration
Carnival Cruise, a defendant seller
out, "itwill
points
product, and as Gilles
waiver by including one with the purchased

Gilles, supra,
counsel not to include such clauses."
become malpractice for corporate

at 377 (emphasis added).
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ensure that arbitrators have adhered to legal standards or that the
63
public interest has been served.

Finally, one of the greatest concerns over the increased use of
ADR is its tendency to undermine further development of the law.
ADR proponent Judge Brazil acknowledged certain judges' fear that
"ADR may be used to reduce the opportunities the courts and the
public have to develop new legal norms." 64 Professor Fiss put it in
somewhat starker terms, claiming that settlements "deprive .
court[s] of ... the ability to render an interpretation ....
for something means to accept less than some ideal. ' 6 5

To settle
In other

words, arbitrators have effectively become the interpreters of law,
while judges have devolved to a last resort: If things go really poorly,
we'll let the courts step in; otherwise the arbitrator's word is final.
In a more recent criticism of ADR, Professors Perschbacher and
Bassett argued that ADR suspends the growth of legal precedent. 6 6
They argue that fewer decided cases result in a body of law with "far
fewer formal, publicly announced decisions applying rules and standards" which in turn "distort[s] the law, because [ADR] ...do[es] not

constitute legal precedent." 67 Correspondingly, the opportunities for
a judge to apply a statute or legal standard to new sets of facts are
reduced, while non precedential arbitration decisions, over which the
courts don't always exercise oversight, take their place. The law
thereby sacrifices its predictability and uniformity in the name of
efficiency.
Ultimately, ADR's dissimilar treatment of similar factual scenarios, inconsistent conclusions, preclusion of the adjudication of
important cases, and neglect of judge-made common law, demand a
solution. Much like the manner in which the dual systems of common
law and equity eventually found a common ground, so must ADR and
traditional adjudication bridge the gaps between them. 6
In light of this, one commentator has argued that certain procedural gaps have effectively already been bridged. 69 Others argue that
63

Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:Panacea or Anathema , 99 HAv.

L. REV. 668, 677-78 (1986) (giving environmental law and family law cases as examples that do not belong in arbitration or mediation).
64
65
66
67

Brazil, supra note 4, at 125.
Fiss, supra note 4, at 1085-86.
Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 5, at 19-22.
Id. at 27.

68 Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 576-77 (arguing generally for a "new merger"
between "our present legal procedure with the 'new equity'"-alternative dispute
resolution).
69 Sabatino, supra note 30, at 1295 (arguing that certain procedural norms such
as notice, discovery, partisan submissions, and subpoenas emerge in ADR).

......
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who issues regulations in his field of specialty unburdened by special
interest or political coercion. 75 One commentator has run with that
evocation, claiming that in the mass tort context, administrative agencies-with authority derived from Congress to "effect binding regulation"-should act as facilitators of private agreements, rather than
relying upon docket-burdened judges like Jack Weinstein. 76 The
rationale is that agencies are sufficiently capable to balance the
numerous and competing interests often at stake in such complex
cases.
Parts II, III, and IV of this Note will sprint forward with that suggestion, arguing that Congress can and should offer litigants an
expert and disinterested administrative alternative to both ADR and
the federal courts.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

A.

Why Does the Legal System Need Precedent?

Although the Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp antitrust dream team
panel mentioned in the Introduction would not be inconceivable in
an ADR setting, its opinions would not promote the development of
public law. This Part proposes that Congress's hybrid system of expert
adjudicators bestow upon the legal community the fruits of its expertise by resolving legal disputes in public forums and issuing reasoned
opinions.
Of course, simply arguing for public resolution of disputes and
written opinions certainly begs the question: Why is the development
of law through institutional resolution of legal disputes important?
Many commentators would argue against it. One main purpose of
ADR, they say, is to insulate litigating parties from the public view. 77

Such a view is not without its critics, however, who argue that secrecy
not only advantages the more well-equipped party,78 but often allows
75 See LANis, supra note 71, at 28.
76 Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration,94 MICH. L. REv. 899,
904 (1996).
77 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEo. LJ. 2663, 2683 (1995) (criticizing
those demanding a "full public airing of the fact-finding and discovery process" as too
focused "on the needs and interests of those other than the immediate parties to
[the] .

.

. dispute").

78 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1075 ("Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be
struck by someone without authority... justice may not be done.").

...
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all relevant legal authority; 6 on the other hand, agency adjudications
can progress more quickly than traditional trials due to the absence of
certain legal formalities.8 7 Additionally, they are conducted by administrative law judges (ALJs), who possess expertise in their field.
B.

The Administrative Procedure Act's Default Rules

The Administrative Procedure Act establishes general rules for
agency action. The modes of agency action consist of two general
modes of rulemaking (informal and formal rulemaking), and two general modes of adjudication (informal and formal adjudication).88 The
first, informal rulemaking-otherwise known as notice and comment
proceedings-permits agencies to adopt rules of governance by giving
written notice to affected persons of an agency's proposed rule and
permitting those persons to comment upon the proposed rule.8 9 The
agency must then take those comments into account in promulgating
a final rule constituting the agency's "basis and purpose" for the rule
adopted. 90 The second, formal rulemaking, requires the agency to follow an elaborate set of procedures before adopting a final rule, permitting cross-examination, discovery, rules of evidence, etc. 91 The
86 Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in AdministrativeAgency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications:A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353, 360 (noting
that "ALJs hear arguments and consider evidence . .. (and] apply relevant statutes,
precedents, and agency regulations").
87 See infra Part III.
88 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTPATVE LAW 193-97 (4th ed. 2007).
89 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
90 Id. § 553(c); see, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to divulge the "thinking that has animated.., a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is based"); Auto. Parts & Accessories
Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (adding in dicta that the "'concise
general statement of ... basis and purpose' mandated by Section [553] will enable
[the reviewing court] to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings"); see also LAWSON, supra note 88, at 243-52 (describing "hybrid APA
rulemaking," in which judges on the D.C. Circuit-the court in which the majority of
administrative appeals are heard-grafted additional procedural requirements onto
agency rulemaking). But see Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-46 (1978) (prohibiting appellate courts from reviewing and overturning agency rulemaking proceedings on the basis of the procedural
devices employed). Vermont Yankee has been understood to apply only to the proceedings themselves, and not to the additional requirements that courts may graft onto
the process of "notice and comment" or publication of a "basis and purpose." LAWSON, supra note 88, at 273-83.
91 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557. The formal rulemaking procedures are listed in
§§ 556-557. Section 553 establishes that agencies must follow these procedures only
when the individual agency's organic statute calls for a hearing "on the record."
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third, informal adjudication imposes "essentially no procedural con92
straints" on the agency in deciding disputes arising between parties.
Finally, formal adjudication imposes the entire panoply of procedures
on agency action between individual litigants. 9 3 These procedures
include notice to the parties, discovery, cross examination, etc., but
are generally regarded as less restrictive than the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 4 Although Congress's hybrid system of administrative adjudi-

cation would use only the fourth method of agency action (i.e. formal
adjudication), agencies do possess wide discretion to use a combina95
tion of rulemaking and adjudication in resolving disputes.
C. A Look at One Agency and How it Would be Imitated
The APA represents merely a default. Congress may impose additional rules on individual agencies in their enabling statutes. The
important point is that Congress can create an agency however it
wants with whatever procedures it wants, subject to constitutional
restraints. 96 Consequently, Congress could legislate a hybrid system of
expert administrative adjudication however it wants. To simplify
Although United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973), did not
expressly state that "on the record" must appear in the agency statute, it has been
interpreted to have so held. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d
1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92 LAWSON, supra note 88, at 323. But see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (holding that section 706 of the APA-providing for de
novo review of agency action-requires agencies to produce "the full administrative
record that was before the [agency]" when it made its decision). Courts may not,
however, dictate to the agencies what the record contains or how they go about producing it. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV, Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1990).
93 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557. These procedures consist of cross examinations,
subpoenas, depositions, conferences for settlement, alternative dispute resolution,
findings and conclusions of law and fact, etc.
94 See Graham, supra note 86, at 382 (arguing that agencies should import evidentiary standards into formal adjudication). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (permitting an
adjudicating agency discretion to receive "[alny oral or documentary evidence" and
to exclude "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence"), with FED. R. EVID.
802 (excluding hearsay evidence from federal trials).
95 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of PolicymakingForm, 71 U. Cm.L. Rxv. 1383,
1409 (2004) (noting that agencies possess wide discretion over the form in which they
choose to act, subject to the agency's own statute, which may limit agency action to
rulemaking, adjudication, or not at all); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
209 (1947) (permitting the SEC to retroactively prohibit holding company managers
from purchasing the company's preferred stock during company reorganization in an
adjudication, rather than issuing a general rule through notice-and-comment
proceedings).
96 See infra Part IV.
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things, I will focus on one agency-the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) 9 7 -whose

formal adjudicatory structure demon-

strates the efficiency, expertise, and legitimacy that the hybrid adjudicatory system must have. A system structured similarly to the CFTC
could realize some of the attributes that neither public nor private law
possesses.
The CFTC has authority to implement the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA), 9s which, among other things, permits disgruntled customers of professional commodity brokers to bring causes of action
against brokers for violations of the CEA. 9 9 One could easily imagine
such a provision in the SEC Act or the FTC Act, where, for example,
antitrust litigants could have their cases heard before our dream team
Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp panel, or a panel of similar expertise but
lesser renown.
Within the CFTC, litigants bring their claims before an ALJ, who
follows the procedural restraints of agency regulations and the APA in
reaching a decision. 10 0 The litigants bring the claims and the ALJ
resolves the claims in a formal adjudication. Furthermore, ALJ resolution culminates in a reasoned opinion following established statutory,
judicial and agency precedent. Whether that opinion binds future
agency adjudications as a stare decisis-type precedent has been a subject of controversy; the controversy has largely found resolution in the
affirmative, albeit not without some disagreement.""1 Even without
97 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(a),
(b) (2000) (granting the CFTC jurisdiction to hear claims brought by persons complaining of violation of provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order issued
pursuant to the Act and also granting CFTC the authority to issue rules "necessary or
appropriate for the efficient and expeditious administration" of the Act).
98 Commodity Exchange Act §§ 1, 8a, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1, 12a(5). (2000) (authorizing
the CFTC to issue regulations carrying out the provisions of the Act).
99 Id.; see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53
(1986). Schor held constitutional the CFTC's promulgation of a regulation-17
C.F.R. § 12.23(b) (2) (2006)-that permitted it to exercise common law counterclaim
jurisdiction over claims arising out of transactions complained of under section 18(a).
See infra Part IV.
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 12.13(b) (2006) (permitting parties to proceed with their
claims through formal adjudication if the amount in dispute is greater than $30,000);
id. §§ 12.300-.400 (providing for a formal hearing before an ALJ including opportunity for cross and direct examination, presentation of documents, subpoena power,
etc.); see also 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2000) (establishing general standards for formal administrative agency adjudications).
101 Richard Murphy has analyzed the Supreme Court's intricate balancing act
between agency precedent on the one hand, and judicial deference to the agencies'
decisions to change their minds on the other. See Richard W. Murphy, JudicialDeference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHio ST. L.J. 1013 (2005). Early courts
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could stipulate that ALJ decisuch an affirmation, however, Congress
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10 3 In such agencies, the adjudicators constioperate in this manner.
scheme, which, although
tute part of the administrative policymaking
of administrative policy, is neverlargely concerned with application
Congress's limited grant of juristheless bound by established law and
ALJ dream team, along
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This Part showed how administrative courts can attain the principles of institutional legitimacy and precedential value-indispensable
attributes of our common law system that are largely absent from
ADR. Part III will consider attributes of an inverse quality from those
discussed in Part II: efficiency and expertise are the hallmarks of any
good arbitration panel, but generally elude the grasp of traditional
adjudication.
III.

EFFICIENCY AND EXPERTISE

Part 11 commenced with a question of purpose. This Part will do
the same: Why are efficiency and expertise important elements of a
system of adjudication? First, litigants want it, and if adjudicatory
regimes place themselves at the service of litigants, then litigants
shouldn't be made to feel unserved. As shown in the introduction,
revolutions in adjudication occur when litigants are dissatisfied with
what they are getting."' Nowhere can one see this more markedly
than in the context of ADR. The common sense view is that litigants
shun traditional forms of adjudication in favor of alternative dispute
resolution for a myriad of reasons. 0 9 Litigants and the legal community in general have voiced complaints about the lack of expertise
among judges, 10 the inefficiency of the process,"'1 and the panacea
108
109

See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69
JUDICATuRE 300, 300 (1986) (noting that the forces underlying ADR developments
focused on "participation, flexibility of both process and result and access to justice of
those previously f6reclosed"). Additionally, see Judge Posner's opinion in an appeal
from a 60(b) order setting aside an arbitration award, which noted that the defendant
"wanted something different from judicial dispute resolution. It wanted dispute resolution by experts in the insurance industry who were bound to have greater knowledge of the parties, based on previous professional experience, than an Article [I
judge, or a jury." Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir.
1983).
110 See e.g., MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAw 200
(1990) (listing the criteria for choosing international arbitrators as "experience of the
arbitrator, preferably in the specific area" and the "arbitrator's knowledge of the languages of the litigants or of the language in which the proceedings will take place");
Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation:An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute
Resolution, 69 JUDiCATuRE 279, 284 (1986) (noting the criteria for choosing neutrals in
early neutral evaluation as including "reputation for good judgment and fairness,
experience in litigation, and to the extent possible, expertise in the subject area"); see
also Michael Noone, Mediating PersonalInjury Disputes, in RETHINKING DispuTES 23, 40
(Julie Macfarlane ed., 1997) (noting the complexity of personal injury compensation
and the "need for depth of knowledge in personal injury law" among mediators).
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that ADR can provide."12 Second, certain cases demand efficiency
and expertise, and litigants in those cases often cannot trust the technical ability of a generalist judge. The cases mentioned by the
presenters at the 1976 Pound Conference are illustrative.' 1 3 Antitrust
provides perhaps the most prominent and complex example,' 1 4 but
other areas of the law can prove to be just as complex and just as
wanting of a technically-sound decisionmaker. I I5 Third, democracy
demands efficient and precise resolution of disputes. Completely
aside from efficiency's embodiment in our nation's founding documents,' 1 6 the undercurrents of demands for efficiency as a democratic
1 17
necessity color the literature of the legal field.
Administrative law courts respond to these demands. From their
very inception, administrative agencies were billed as expert disinterested regulatory regimes that could deal with issues of commerce,
111 See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 110, at 200 ("Those trained in law sometimes indulge in slow... proceedings... which is exactly what the parties usually wish
to avoid by referring the dispute to arbitration.").
112 See Brazil et al., supra note 110, at 279 (noting studies showing that expediting
pleadings and discovery through mediation can speed adjudication).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 (citing antitrust cases involving
thousands of documents, hundreds of witnesses and dozens of lawyers in a complex
area of the law).
114 See, e.g., FYC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986). In this case,
the defendants made certain pro-competitive justifications for concertedly withholding x-ray information from insurance companies, among them that "x-rays, standing
alone, are not adequate bases for diagnosis of dental problems or for the formulation
of an acceptable course of treatment." Id. Whether a district court would he
equipped to answer that question and others inevitably arising in the course of litigation is a point of dispute.
115 See Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30 (discussing the use of ADR in IP context);
see also Dianne Saxe, Water Disputes in Ontario:Environmental Dispute Resolution and the
Public Interest, inRETHuNKINc DispurFs, supra note 110, at 233, 237 (noting the appeal
of "technically qualified mediators" in environmental disputes).
116 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury in criminal prosecutions).
117 See Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 564 (noting that litigation has sprawled into a
complex system in which attorneys often have the most at stake, clients have lost their
ability to "decide whether, when, where, and against whom to bring suit," and
extreme expenses and delays are more often the norm than not (citing In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1338-40, 1344-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(costing $9 million in attorneys' fees in $180 million class settlement with 2.4 million
plaintiffs))); see also Burger, supra note 15, at 92 ("Jurors, witnesses and litigants continue to have their time squandered. They are . . .shuffled about court-houses in
confusion caused by poor management within the courts. The delays and high costs
in resolving civil disputes continue to frighten away potential litigants.").
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energy resources, drugs, etc. more effectively than Congress.' 1 8 Obviously, the regulatory state itself has its critics."t 9 Rather than tackle
the criticisms of the administrative state from the nondelegation perspective, I will focus instead upon the adjudicators within administra12 0
tive agencies-administrative law judges.
The expertise virtues of using administrative courts in specialized
adjudication arise from the nature of the adjudicators themselves.
The Office of Personnel Management examines, certifies, and
appoints competent ALJs through a lengthy process of interviews,
tests, and evaluations.' 12 Through a practice known as "selective certification," ALJ candidates with particularized expertise can receive
preference in appointment as long as they have two years of experience hearing formal cases in the field. 122 An individual agency, such
as the FTC for example, when seeking to appoint ALJs with specialized antitrust knowledge-such as the Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp
panel-could select them on the basis of expertise "in the field of
[antitrust] law."' 23 The agency-and, incidentally, those appearing
before agency adjudicators-therefore have an expectation that the
adjudicators possess the requisite expertise.
Additionally, the expertise of the ALJs within each agency will be
implemented over the jurisdiction that each agency possesses. Rather
than submitting their disputes before a traditional forum of general
jurisdiction, litigants could bring their disputes before specialized
tribunals. Because each agency possesses its own ALJs, whose skills are
specially tailored to adjudicating specialized disputes, litigants will
gain the benefits of expert adjudications that those agencies offer. In
118 LMDIS, supra note 71, at 154-55 (1938) (referring to agency administrators as
men of professional attainment in various fields").
119 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower:
A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 326-34 (1993)
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an affirmative grant of legislative
power, but it is limited by the word "proper" and by underlying constitutional principles, including separation of powers); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the
Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 COR-

NELL L. REv. 1,9 (1994) (advocating a formalist approach to separation of powers that
would permit "[n]o commingling of legislative, executive or judicial power... except

where specifically provided in the constitutional text" and acknowledging that such a
model would not harmonize with the current administrative state). The nondelegation concerns raised by these authors are beyond the scope of this Note.
120 See supra Part II (discussing ALJs in the CFTC).
121 SeeJeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal AdministrativeLaw Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible
Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 112-20 (1981).
122 Id. at 117-19,
123 Id. at 117 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MCIrr., ANNOUNCEMENT No. 318 (1979
ed.)).
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could take place
allusion to the Introduction, ALJ adjudications
Antitrust Division ALJs in
before SEC ALJs in securities actions,
ALJs in commodities trading
anticompetitive practice actions, CFTC
actions, etc.
agencies can offer,
In addition to the advantages of expertise that
arise from the libadvantages
efficiency advantages also exist. These
24 This phenomenon
that ALJs can utilize.'
eral use of evidence rules 25
The rationale for permitting such effiis not without its critics.'
adjudicator. An expert ALJ is
ciency depends upon expertise of the
between useless and misleadmore likely to recognize the difference
and useful instructive hearing nonhearsay evidence on the one hand,
the latter and excluding the
say evidence on the other; in admitting
otherwise necessitate countformer, he expedites a process that might
federal courts. Further,
less motions and procedural safeguards in the
the concern some litigants
the use of agency adjudication obviates
a jury of their peers. Litigants'
have with subjecting their disputes to
preclude precise resofears that jury manipulation and jury ineptitude such cynical slogans
in
lution of disputes have manifested themselves
than demonstrate
more
no
26
as: "[C]ross examination invariably does
final decision."'
the
to
irrelevant
points
trial
score
forensic talent or
the last thing a litigant wants is
With thousands of dollars on the line,
pocus and junk
a jury susceptible to technical hocus
a judge 2or
7
science.1
also 17 C.F.R. § 12.312(e) (2006) (providing
124 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000); see
and
adjudications). "Relevant, material
formal
for admissibility of evidence in CFTFC
unduly
and
unreliable
Irrelevant, immaterial,
reliable evidence shall be admitted.
Id.
excluded."
be
shall
repetitious evidence
of the
367-84 (advocating for application
at
86,
note
supra
Graham,
125 See, e.g.,
hearings, arguing that the APA standard,
Federal Rules of Evidence in administrative
eliminating argument over admissibility,
by
delays
5 U.S.C. § 556(d), does not avoid
records through the submission of marbut increases them by creating "voluminous
that some agencies-including the NLRB
ginally relevant. . . evidence" and noting
that
of Evidence "so far as practicable," but
and the FCC-apply the Federal Rules
and
Evidence
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such an approach is unpredictable).
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at
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use of Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
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"is equally exposed to the evidence
oral evifor
written
of
substitution
including
(noting other ALJ deviations from FRE,
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126 Gellhorn, supra note 125, at 40.
2006, at A9.
Quackspertise, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
127 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein,
that have
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state
those
in
of lawsuits arising
Bernstein notes the extreme example
Pharmaceuticals,
Dow
Merrell
v.
Daubert
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not adopted the rule of evidence formulated
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Using ALJs to hear litigation begs its own questions: To what
extent is the ALJ beholden to the agency? How much weight does the
decision of the ALJ carry-i.e. are agencies free to overrule him?
Does the administrative process not merely add another layer to the
adjudicatory system-i.e. to what extent can parties just appeal an ALJ
28
decision to a district or appellate court?1
The first question raises issues of prosecutorial and judicial independence. If the ALJ is beholden to a prosecuting agency, then-as
the theory goes-he will be more likely to find in favor of the
agency 1 29 In reality, both Congress and the agency itself can provide
a buffer between the ALJ and the prosecuting agency. The CFTC, for
instance, has promulgated a regulation providing ALJs "will not be
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any ...
employee . . . of the Commission engaged in . . . investigative or

prosecutorial functions." 13 0 Furthermore, the proposed hybrid system
of administrative adjudication contemplates actions between private
litigants in which the agencies themselves are not parties to the case-similar to the disgruntled customer provision of the CFTC. I3 1
509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993), requiring general acceptance of expert methodology within
the scientific community. Bernstein, supra. Theoretically, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence would preclude such evidence in federal court. FED. R. EvID. 702.
128 For an article discussing the virtues of choosing one body of substantive law
over another (in this case, election law versus tax law) to resolve issues, including a
discussion of the implications of agency capture, see Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much
Maligned 527 and InstitutionalChoice, 87 B.U. L. RFv. (forthcoming June 2007) (manuscript at 17, 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925529.
129 This concern would come up, for example, in the context of SEC or FTC investigations. The FTC can investigate potential antitrust violations, bring these before an
ALJ within the FTC, and prosecute the violator based upon the findings. See, e.g., 16
C.F.R. § 3.2 (2006) (providing for formal proceedings for those violations of statutes
requiring determination "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing").
The SEC, likewise, can investigate securities trading improprieties, bring these before
an ALJ in an SEC action, and prosecute the violators based upon the findings. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12j, 15 U.S.C. § 7810) (2000) (providing for
SEC suspension of a security after a hearing "on the record after notice and
opportunity").
130 17 C.F.R. § 12.8 (2006); see Bruff, supra note 10, at 346-47 (noting that Congress often separates adjudicators from the rest of the agency, but that results are
inconclusive as to whether "split enforcement" better promotes fairness); see also 17
C.F.R. § 12.305 (2006) (allowing the parties to a formal adjudication to "request an
[ALJI to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal bias, conflict of interest, or
similar bases" and allowing the parties to seek an interlocutory review by the agency of
the ALJ's decision).
131 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000); see supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing the disgruntled customer suit provision of the CTFC Act and Commodity Futures TradingCommission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986)).
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in a particular outcome, it
Although the agency may have an interest
intervene. Additionally, agencies
will lack as strong an incentive to
over an ALJ; they are removable
cannot dangle the threat of removal
Syscause as determined by the Merit
only after a hearing for 3 good
2
tems Protection Board.
of ALJ decisions-has a
The second question-agency reversal
of it occurring. First, final deternilong case history to allay any fears
within
if not appealed to the agency
1 33 Although
nations of the ALJ become final
organic statute.
the time period specified in the agency's
against the decisions of ALJs, the
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134
Congress
activism.
courts frown upon such agency

Furthermore,

provision in the hybrid system
could theoretically provide a statutory
review of ALJ decisions, unless
statute restricting or stripping agency or statute. 135
regulations
manifestly against agency
final agency decisions to a fedTo the third question-appeals of
agency decisions are appealaeral court-one could say that although
review the merits or the application
ble,13 6 courts are not expected to
ask whether the agency acted
of law in a particular case, but merely
in the agency's enabling statwithin the boundaries set by Congress
decision itself is subject to deferute.3 7 The substance of the agency
132 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
ALJ decision if
for appeal to the agency from an
133 See id. § 557(b) (providing
rule).
individual agency
made within the time provided by
carry great
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at
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134 See LAWSON,
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saw
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who
made by adjudicators
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for
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account
explicitly
must
later notes, "agencies
witnesses." Id. In fact, as Lawson
findings,
that in reviewing the ALJ's formal
findings of initial adjudicators," meaning
for why the ALJ decided a case
justification
and
the agency must provide reasoning
Cir. 1995)
of Treasury, 61 F.3d 888, 892 (Fed.
incorrectly. Id.; see Kimn v. Dep't
"articumust
agency
that
stating
ALJ findings and
(overturning agency rejection of
its confor
ALJ]
[a] record [largely compiled by the
late [ sound reasons, based on
trary evaluation").
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review of ALJ decisions would essentially
135 Completely stripping agency
supra
Bruff,
See
Court.
Tax
the
like
courts
administrative courts similar to legislative
organizaI Tax Court judges "reside in separate
note 10, at 345 (noting that Article
tions from the agencies they review").
review); see, e.g., 7
agency actions subject to judicial
136 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (making
securiof any CFTC order filed under disgruntled
U.S.C. § 18(e) (permitting appeal
Court of Appeals).
ties customer statute to a United States
action).
Chevron two-step analysis of agency
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137 See supra note 101 (discussing
Agency
Protection
regulation of the Environmental
In Chevron, the Court reviewed a
establish
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quality
air
certain national
allowing states that had not attained
major stationary sources," of pollution.
modified
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"new
regulating
permit programs
842-43 (1984)
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
(5) (2000)).
7502(c)
§
U.S.C.
42
version at
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (current
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ence and the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, as long as the agency remains within the bounds of
an unambiguous statute. 138 A look at statistical evidence from one
particular agency suggests that the rate of appeals from agency decisions is not that high; 159 the threat of specialized AL adjudication
simply constituting an additional layer of review therefore remains
low. Judge Robert Bork has even gone so far as to suggest that disputes arising in administrative courts and other Article I courts should
be denied access to Article III courts unless "an important question of
statutory construction or constitutional law was raised."1 40 While the
notion is undoubtedly interesting, it extends beyond the scope of this
Note. Ultimately, the important assertion of the preceding
paragraphs is that the structural attributes of agency adjudication do
not inhibit their efficiency.
The use of administrative courts is not without its concerns, however. Agency "capture" is a common concern of critics of administrative agencies. 4 ' One commentator has noted that the "tension
The regulation allowed a state to "adopt a plantwide definition of the term 'stationary
source,'" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, meaning the state could consider all of the pollution-emitting devices of a plant to be one "stationary source" for purposes of the EPA.
Consequently, a state could permit a plant to install new equipment as long as the
installation would not increase total emission from the plant. Chevron sued, and the
Supreme Court held for the agency, id. at 865-66, creating the Chevron deference
two-step analysis discussed in note 101.
138 This statement obviously produces some tension with my assertion in Part I1,
that ALJ decisions can serve as precedent because courts expect them to reach results
consistent with previous adjudications. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Given courts' reluctance to approve retroactive orders arising from agency adjudications, and recent hostility toward agency decisions that depart from previous agency
precedent, one can say that while courts will give deference to ALJ decisions-a la
Chevron-they will be loathe to do so when the ALJ departs from precedent upon
which the parties to a dispute had relied.
139 U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORTFY 1998-1999, app. A, available at http://www.oshrc.gov/publications/biennial/biennial98-99.html. The OSHRC received 2324 new cases in 1999: 156 of those were disposed of by ALJs after a formal hearing, 2025 of which were disposed of by ALJs
without a formal hearing, and 43 were disposed of by commissioners. Of these cases,
28 were appealed to the circuit courts. Id.
140 Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
238-39 (1976).
141 Matthew D. Zinn, PolicingEnvironmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 107-11 (2002). Zinn discusses capture
theory-the notion that regulators are susceptible to the private interests of the regulated, specifically regulated industries-in the context of environmental regulation
and summarizes the factors most likely to lead to agency "capture" in general. Id. at
108-09. They include: a small number of regulated interest groups, scarcity of
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between expertise and bias has existed for centuries. 142 Although
both these concerns and the concerns involving ALJ independence
from the agency itself are valid, solutions exist. Congress could, as it
has done in past statutes, provide for ALJ independence in enabling
statutes.1 43 Additionally, it could provide for procedural safeguards in
the selection of ALJs. 144 Finally, the administrative structure and subsequent case law themselves have insulated ALJ decisions from the
145
intervention of their employing agency.
An additional concern comes from the use of alternative non-ALJ
"presiding officers" or administrative judges (AJs) in agency adjudications. 14 6 AJs enjoy even less protection from agency bias than ALJs
and are generally regarded as less qualified than ALJs. Typically, however, they are not employed in formal adjudication. 147 The answer to
the AJ quandary lies in Congress simply eliminating their use or providing similar criteria for hiring as apply to ALJs. Although this valid
agency resources, regulated groups' influence over elected officials, and the tendency
of agency regulators to regulate with an eye toward jobs in regulated industries. Id. at
108-11; see also ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 40-43 (1971) ("Most regulatory issues are of deep interest to regulated industries

...

.

142 Bruff, supra note 10, at 346.
143 See supra note 130.
144 As mentioned in this Part, hiring of ALJs is done by the Office of Personnel
Management. See 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (2000).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
146 SeeJudith Resnik, JudicialIndependence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72
S. CAL. L. REv, 657, 659 (1999); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the
Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70-73, 77 (1996) (noting the
differences between ALJs and non-ALJs). Lubbers notes that the number of ALJs not
working in either the NLRB, the Department of Labor, or the Social Security Administration declined from 170 to 155 between 1984 and 1996. Id. at 70. The number of
AJs-who on average earn approximately $40,000 less than AJs-rose to 2692 in
1989. Id. at 70-73. In contrast to the hiring of AJs, the hiring of ALJs is a highly
scrutinized process. The agency must oftentimes "giv[eI short shrift to special expertise" unless the applicant has extensive litigation or formal hearing experience. Id. at
73. Lubbers advocates reinstituting a multi-grade structure of hiring ALJs, retaining
the ALJ title, and providing a "real career path for aspiring administrativejudges." Id.
at 77. For the specialized hybrid system to have success, I believe it should preserve
the integrity of the ALJ office. Therefore, I agree with Lubbers's contentions.
147 This is not to say that AJs and other "presiding officers" are never employed in
what one commentator has called "relatively formal adjudications." SeeJeffery Lubbers, FederalAgency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 383, 387 (1984). Lubbers's article discusses congressional efforts in the 1980s to
separate ALJs from their respective agencies and to create a national corps of ALJs,
concentrated mainly in the Department of Labor and the Social Security Administration. Id. at 385-86. Lubbers notes that the congressional plan failed to account for
the hundreds of AJs and presiding officers that hear substantially more-albeit less
formal-cases than ALJs. Id.

2007]

SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION

1635

concern warrants additional discussion, it is beyond the scope of this
Note.
This Part has shown how administrative courts would provide an
answer to the efficiency and expertise concerns at the heart of ADR's
complaints against traditional adjudication. Part IV poses a more salient question: Is this sort of thing even constitutional?
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SPECIALTY HYBRID SYSTEM

Policies advocating reform do not exist in a legal vacuum. Constitutional restraints prohibit the creation of certain types of courts, certain types of adjudication, and certain acts of Congress. Congress may
face limitations in implementing a system of non-Article III 'jury-less"
adjudications. Additionally, in providing for adjudications in an
administrative forum, Congress has disturbed certain due process
rights associated with Article III judicial independence. To what
extent is Congress even authorized to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction and to what extent is Congress authorized to then place that
jurisdiction in the hands of ALJs?
A. Jury Trial
The 1976 Pound Conference produced a plethora of vitriolic criticism directed toward traditional means of adjudication. 148 The conference participants reserved a most healthy dose of that criticism for
the use of the jury trial in civil cases in the United States. Indeed, the
United States is an anomaly in this regard; 149 but the arguments for
"preser[ving]" the Seventh Amendment's cherished right to a jury
trial have, over the years, retained their vitality, emphasizing the Seventh Amendment's role as a harbinger of democracy. 50 This occurs
much to the chagrin of reformers,' 5 1 who note concerns with runaway
148
149

See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
See RowE T AL., supra note 44, at 218-19.

150 U.S. CONST. amend VII ("[W] here the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."); see also Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 671 (2001) ("The federal Constitutional
right to a jury trial has long been deemed one of the fundamental elements of our
system ofjustice."); Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1037, 1056-57 (1999) (noting that jury service "brings community values into the judicial process . . . educates the citizenry" and ensures "political
participation").
151 See Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 547 (noting strong arguments in support of
such items of American exceptionalism as the jury trial). Tidmarsh cautions that
"nostalgia blind[s] us to the trend line .... [W]e must develop a clear understanding
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jury verdicts and damages awards,1 52 technical incompetence,1 53 and
I 54
susceptibility to deft attorney "gamesmanship."
The Supreme Court announced the test for application of the
jury right in Chauffers Local No. 391 v. Teny. 155 Money damages suits
that would have required a jury at common law at the time of the
nation's founding must be tried before ajury.1 56 Exceptions do exist,
however, for certain complex issues. 1 5 7 Additionally, the jury right's
vitality shows susceptibility in the context of waiver.' 58 Although, as
one commentator has noted, courts are reluctant to enforce pure jury
trial waiver without the parties' negotiation and knowing consent to
the waiver, this reluctance dissipates in the context of arbitration. 59
As noted earlier in the mass tort context, 160 arbitration clauses can
take cases out of traditional adjudicatory forums before their facts
even materialize, and can place them in the hands of arbitrators. The
Supreme Court itself favors and enforces arbitration clauses, despite
161
their effective evisceration of the jury trial right.
of the procedural pieces we must ... jettison." Id.; see supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 431 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The size of the trial jury's verdict in State Farm prompted
Justice Ginsburg to state "Itlhe large size of the award ... in this case indicates why
damages-capping legislation may be altogether fitting and proper." Id. Justice Ginsburg dissented on grounds that the Court had attempted to reform state law of punitive damages through use of the Due Process Clause. Id.
153 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In rejapanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting the complexity of
an antitrust case precluded trial by jury).
154 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 205.
155 494 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1990).
156 Id.
157 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996) (permitting the judge to determine the construction of certain terms of art within a claim
before a jury); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (holding in a
trademark damages case that to maintain a suit at equity, rather than at law before a
jury, "the plaintiff must ... show that the [case is] of such a 'complicated nature' that
only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel [it]" (quoting Kirby v. Lake Shore &
Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887))); Matushita, 631 F.2d at 1084 (holding that
"[D]ue process precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to [decide rationally and
resolve each disputed issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the
evidence .

.

. and application of relevant legal rules]").

158 FED. R. Crv. P. 38(d) (jury trial of right waived if not asserted); see Sternlight,
supra note 150, at 678.
159 Sternlight, supra note 150, at 695.
160 Gilles, supra note 62, at 375.
161 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-33 (1991) (finding that mandatory arbitration could be imposed on an employee in an employment
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but has not gained nearly enough traction to justify predicating an
16 8
entire adjudicatory system upon these holdings.
In reality, however, the concern over the Seventh Amendment
undermining the hybrid-specialty system might not even matter. As
one commentator has noted, even if the litigants to a hybrid-court
dispute had not waived their right to a jury trial, "[lthe Court has
permitted legislative courts to assert jurisdiction over public... rights
without regard to the consent of the litigants. '169
B. Article III Values: Adjudication Before an Administrative Tribunal
Congress has authorized quasi-judicial acts before non-Article III
courts, commissions, and other entities since its early history. 170 But is
such authorization constitutional? Can Congress enact a statute and
mandate that all causes of action arising under that statute be adjudicated before a non-Article III court?
The Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of such
arrangements in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 171
In Murray's Lessee, the plaintiff-a federal tax collector for the port of
New York-had accumulated excess accounts in violation of his
employment obligations.1 72 The Solicitor of the Treasury, acting pursuant to an act of Congress permitting liens to be laid on lands of
persons indebted to the United States, 73 issued a "warrant of distress"
for the balance found after an audit of the plaintiff's account.1 74 The
plaintiff raised two objections to the auditing and warrant. First, he
argued that the warrant constituted a taking of property without due
process of law1 75 Second, he argued that Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution required such judicial power as the issuance of a warrant
to be situated firmly in the judicial branch. 176 The Court disagreed.
Although-as the court admitted-"the auditing of the accounts of a
168 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (noting that "it will
indeed be a rare case in which" the plaintiff can prove the burden of showing that

issues are too complicated for a jury to comprehend).
169 Sward, supra note 150, at 1116; see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 585-90 (1985).
170 See RICHARD FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. METZLER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 919 (5th ed. 2003).

171

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).

172
173

Id. at 274-75.
Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, 3 Stat. 592, 592-96 (codified as amended at 31

U.S.C. § 506 (2000)).
174
175
176

Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 275.
Id.
Id.
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8
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Court ruled that it constituted a "public right" susceptible of-but not
requiring-judicial determination. 8 6
This particular definition of "public rights"-rights associated
with congressionally created benefits programs-underlay the Court's
momentous reassembly of the federal bankruptcy court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.18 7 Justice Brennan,

writing for a slim plurality, admitted that "[t]he distinction between
public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in
our precedents."' 8 8 He then relied on "public rights" doctrine to limit
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. t8 9 Northern Pipeline involved a
common law contract case brought before the bankruptcy court-a
legislative court created by Congress whose core function was "the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations." 190 Justice Brennan ruled
that while this core function-involving a "public right" created by the
Bankruptcy Act-was indeed a permissible exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over common law contract claims-as differentiated from
the Bankruptcy court's normal docket of restructuring cases-was not
allowed. 19 1
Justice White dissented, noting that the plurality's holding
92
threatened-as it most surely did-the entire administrative state.
Indeed, Justice Brennan addressed this seeming inconsistency, albeit
rather awkwardly, saying that as long as the "essential attributes of
judicial power are retained in the Art. III court," the Article I court
could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 19 3
Justice White's dissent, which argued for allowing Congress to
balance Article III virtues with administrative efficiency values,19 4 bore
186
187
188

Id. at 50.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 69.
189 Id. at 71-72, 76. Brennan also noted that exceptions to Article IlIadjudication
had been made in a limited number of circumstances, namely territorial courts
(before westward expansion in the nineteenth century), courts-martial, and administrative courts adjudicating purely "public rights." Id. at 71.

190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 102, 113 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the decision threatened "a
large body of administrative law" and, read literally, would "overrule a large number
of our precedents upholding a variety of Art. I courts-not to speak of those [Article]
I courts that go by the contemporary name of 'administrative agencies'"); see also
Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline

Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 214-24 (rejecting as inadequate both Justice Brennan's
and justice White's approaches).

193

N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81 (majority opinion).

194

Id. at 117-18 (White, J., dissenting).
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fruit in later Court opinions. First in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.' 95 and later in Commodity Futures Trading Commission
V. Schor,1 9 6 the Court upheld the constitutionality of federally mandated adjudication in non-Article III forums. In Union Carbide, the
Court permitted Congress to require binding arbitration of claims
19 7
filed under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
with limited Article III judicial review. 198
Union Carbide relied on Crowelfs proposition that cases arising
from rights created by federal regulatory programs-"public rights"are susceptible to non-Article III adjudication. 199 This effectively
rejected Northern Pipeline's definition of "public rights" (public benefit
20 0
programs or instances where the government is a party to the case)
in lieu of a new one (federal regulatory programs). 20 1 Schor continued this line of reasoning. Schor featured two parties 2 0 2-one, a disgruntled stock customer, the second, a broker who the customer had
sued for violation of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Act.20 3- The case was heard before the CFTC who, six years earlier,
had issued a regulation permitting counterclaims arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the underlying claim. 20 4 The
defendant stock broker in Schor took advantage of the regulation to
counterclaim against the plaintiff.20 5 When the Commission resolved
the case in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff asserted that the Com20 6
mission never had jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
195 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
196 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
197 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
198 Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 582-84.
199 Id. at 586-89 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)) (echoing Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline that "practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article

niI).
200 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68, 71-72
(1982).
201 Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 593-94 ("[Clongress, acting for a valid legislative
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary.")
202 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986).
203 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 106, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 18(a), (b) (2000).
204 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (2006).
205 Schor, 478 U.S. at 837-38.
206 Id. at 838.
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After reviewing the statutory authority, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, relied directly on Union Carbide and implicitly on Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline, stating "resolution of claims
such as [plaintiff's] cannot turn on conclusory reference to the language of Article III."2o7 She then addressed the counterclaim, stating
that Congress's interest in providing an expert and expeditious forum
for resolution of the original claims necessarily made common law
counterclaims candidates for administrative adjudication.208 Employing a four-factor balancing test,20 9 O'Connor relegated the "public
rights" doctrine to jurisprudential oblivion, stating: "there is no reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the state law
character of a ['private rights'] claim talismanic power in Article III
2 10
inquiries."
While Schor did not overrule Northern Pipeline explicitly, 2 11 one
must wonder whether Northern Pipeline still has staying power. Schor
seems to permit non-Article III courts to exercise jurisdiction over
cases normally heard by either federal or state court judges, as long as
the case is not terribly important and the judicial power is not terribly
infringed. 2 12 Northern Pipeline, however, seemed to deny that same
exercise ofjurisdiction to the Bankruptcy court. Indeed, Justice Brennan, the author of Northern Pipeline's plurality opinion, dissented in
Schor, noting that the Court had favored "legislative convenience" over
the precedent set in Northern Pipeline.2 15 In all likelihood, even if Schor
did not overrule Northern Pipeline,its and Union Carbide's definition of
"public rights" departed from Northern Pipeline's. "Public rights" as
understood by the Union Carbidemajority are not rights arising from
207

Id. at 847 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583

(1985)).
208 Id. at 855-57.
209 Id. at 851 ("H] the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power'
are reserved to the Article III courts,. . . (2] the extent to which the non-Article III
forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article
III courts, [3] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and [41 the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111").
210 Id. at 853.
211 Id. at 852-53. Schor distinguished Northern Pipeline because the bankruptcy
court in that case had expansive jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under
title l1 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)). The Court in Schor reasoned
that although the CFTC had jurisdiction over state law counterclaims arising out of
CfITC proceedings, claimants in the proceedings were required to subsequently seek
enforcement by a district court. Id.
212 Id,at 851.
213 Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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federal benefits programs; nor are they "matters arising between the
Government and persons subject to its authority."2 1 4 They are instead
rights arising under federal statutes that do not "depend on or replace
a ight... under state law."2 15 Thus, Union Carbiderestricted Northern
Pipeline's holding to a prohibition on Congressional "vest[ing] in a
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment,
and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants." 2 16 And Schor chipped
another chunk off of Northern Pipeline by providing an exception for
common law counterclaims in administrative adjudications. 2 17 Schor
and Union Carbide permit the hybrid system of expert administrative
adjudication proposed in Part I, not only to the extent that panels will
be able to hear claims arising under federal statutes, but also counterclaims and related claims arising out of the same facts or
circumstances.
Yet one lingering issue remains: the jury trial. Although the
hybrid system seems to pass Article III muster, it must also withstand
the scrutiny of the Seventh Amendment, Crowell, Union Carbide, and
Schor all involved cases in which the defendant could have sought a
jury, but for the waiver of the jury right by the parties involved. Can
Congress really mandate that litigants try their cases before administrative tribunals without a jury?
As the Crowell-Union Carbide-Schorline of cases show, the Court has
been receptive to administrative agency adjudication without a jury
trial when the adjudications involve either federal benefits programs
or federal regulatory programs. The bankruptcy court, however, has
had less success before the Court. Aside from Northern Pipeline, the
Court also decided Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg,2 1 8 holding that a
claim brought by a bankrupt corporation's trustee to void a fraudulent transfer from the corporation's predecessor to its creditor was
entitled to a jury trial where the creditor had not submitted a claim
against the corporation in bankruptcy court. 2 19 The trustee of the

corporation in Granfinancierahad filed a petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11.220 The trustee then filed suit within one year of
the petition against petitioner, a Columbian financial institution that
214 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585 (1985) (citing
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68).

215
216
217
218
219
220

Id. at 584.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 202-14.
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Id. at 57-58 & n.13; id. at 64-65.
Id. at 36.
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had received $1.7 million from the corporation without consideration. 22 ' The petitioner claimed a jury right, but the Bankruptcy court

disagreed. The Supreme Court reversed both that court and the two
lower courts.
In doing so, the Court resurrected the "public rights" doctrine
but noted that for public rights, the Seventh Amendment does not
grant parties a jury right if "Congress assigns its adjudication to an
administrative agency.122 2 Although the Court gave no reason for its
apparent distinction between administrative courts and legislative
courts in the jury trial context, the Court has historically treated them
differendy.2 23 One commentator has suggested that this is a mere
result of general deference to the administrative state;2 24 as justice
White noted in Northern Pipeline, a decision of such dismantling magnitude could have momentous effects. 22 5 Other scholars have echoed
the same sentiments, noting that the adjudicatory functions of the
entire administrative state could be thrown into doubt. 226 It is also

possible that agencies' greater involvement in the adjudicatory process ensures a bit of supervision that the bankruptcy court does not
have.
The Court, however, would resist such a distinction. In its view,
administrative courts and legislative courts are subject to the same
constitutional strictures; the fact that the Bankruptcy court has faired
more poorly than administrative agencies is a product of mere coincidence. The Court in Granfinancierawent to great lengths, in fact, to
preserve nearly all of its non-Article III court case law. It rejected the
Northern Pipeline view that "matter[s] of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others, "'2 2 7 and emphasized
that private rights "so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution" were per221

Id.

222

Id. at 42 n.4,

223 Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Go. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (holding unconstitutional the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a common
law contract claim that arose out of a restructuring dispute), with Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986) (permitting the CFTC's exer-

cise of jurisdiction over a common law contract counterclaim filed in response to a
claim filed by a disgruntled stock customer alleging a violation of the CFTC Act).
224

225
226

(4th
over
227

See Sward, supra note 150, at 1096-97.

N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 102.
See, e.g., 1 RicmtARDJ. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.1, at 28-29
ed. 2002) (noting that Northern Pipeline "cast a shadow of uncertain magnitude
the constitutionality of the adjudicatory powers granted to many agencies").
Cranfinanciera,492 U.S. at 54 (citing N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 69).
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missible.2 28 It declined to decide, however, whether the restructuring
of debtor-creditor relations in bankruptcy constituted, in fact, a "public right." 229 Additionally, it held that the trustee's fraudulent conveyance suit was one that would have been tried before a jury at common
law and thus its entitlement to a jury trial at modern law depended
"upon whether the creditor ha[d] submitted a claim against
the
estate, not... upon whether Congress chanced to deny jury trials to
creditors who have not filed claims and who are sued by a trustee to
recover an alleged preference." 2301 In short, the Court found that the
fraudulent conveyance suit was not sufficiently integral to the bankruptcy court's statutory scheme to deserve an exemption from the Seventh Amendment. Had the suit been part of a bankruptcy court
proceeding, however, it is arguable that the Court would have allowed
23 1
the suit to proceed without a jury.
Granfinanciera'sconclusion ultimately equates its Article III jurisprudence with its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and implicitly
affirms the holdings of Union Carbide, Schor, and Crowell: "[T] he question whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to [use
administrative tribunals] that do[] not employ juries ... requires the
same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to
assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal." 232 Thus, it is clear that nothing in the Seventh Amendment
under Granfinanciera prohibits Congress from accomplishing anything that it can constitutionally accomplish under the Crowell-SchorUnion Carbide line of cases. Unless a claim coming before an administrative agency tribunal were either not sufficiently integral to the
228 Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94
(1985) (Brennan,J., concurring)).
229 Id. at 55-56 & n.11. Arguably, much of what the Court currently categorizes as
.public rights" could be interpreted differently. See PIERCE, supra note 226, § 7.1, at
28-29 ("A great deal of what modern federal agencies do can be characterized as
resolution of disputes with respect to private rights."). This demonstrates that one's
point of reference for defining "public rights" will ultimately determine the outcome:
A definition that turns on whether Congress has provided a structure to solve private
disputes will cull more cases into the concept of "public rights," whereas a definition
that turns on the identity of the parties-as Northern Pipelinedid-will tend to exclude

more cases from that concept.
230
231

Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 58.
This depends, of course, on whether the Court would even consider restructur-

ing to be a "public right." See supra note 211 and accompanying text. For purposes of
an administrative hybrid scheme of adjudication, a court would have to inquire both

as to whether a particular cause of action brought before an agency were sufficiently
integral to the regulatory scheme, and whether that regulatory scheme were even a
.public right."
232 Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 53.
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scheme itself were not conagency's statutory scheme or the statutory
assign

Congress could constitutionally
sidered to be a "public right,"
231
that claim to the tribunal.
CONCLUSION

lies not in their somewhat
The allure of administrative agencies
but in their ability to
controversial conformance with the Constitution in the modern age.
cases arising
apply expertise to the complexity of
have a jury of one's peers
It no longer suffices-nor is it desirable-to
violator, a medical malpractice
decide the fate of an alleged antitrust
dispute. Congress realizes this.
victim, or an international contract
courts realize this. Although the
Litigants realize this. And even
has become more technical and
nature of traditional adjudication
34
question whether courts or expert
expertoriented,2 one must still
such complex issues.
panels are better equipped to determine
has been clear. Many disputes
For litigants, certainly, the choice
with a trial now conclude in arbithat originally may have concluded
in selecting an expert adjudicatration. Litigants value the autonomy
who can deliver a disposition
tor familiar with its industry and practice
come at the detriment to society
in a cost-efficient way. But this may
claim, but it is one that evokes
at large; this is an admittedly nebulous
may reach different concluquestions: Does it matter that arbitrators
it matter that litigants can consent
sions on similar sets of facts? Does
Does it matter that arbitrators are
to what law will and will not apply?
(notComm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855-56
233 See Commodity Futures Trading
disputes
of
out
common law counterclaims arising
ing that Congress's assignment of
regulatory
effective a specific and limited federal
before the CFTC sought to "mak[e]
to,
"incidental
was
of the counterclaims
scheme" and that the CFTC's adjudication
federal
by
created
claims
reparations
of
and completely dependent upon, adjudication
added)).
(emphasis
law"
2000)
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C.
234 See e.g., United States v. Microsoft
monopolize,
to
attempts
over Microsoft's
(involving highly technical antitrust action
system, and anticompetitive behavior
operating
its
to
browser
tying of its internet
2001); Smith v.
rev 'd in part,253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
toward rival firms), affd in part and
business judglandmark
(Del. 1985) (involving
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-81
the
considered
not
had
directors
board of
ment rule case finding that a company's
sale,
"true value" in accepting an offer for
appropriate value of the company's
companies, but
insurance
and
officers,
directors,
prompting an outcry not only from
8 § 102(b) (7)
well); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
from the Delaware legislature as
care cases);
of
duty
in
action
immunize director
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&
Law
Chi.
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And does it matter that these
neither bound by nor create precedent?
strip the legal system of its
arbitrations, hidden from public view,
opportunity to develop its norms and standards?
adjudications provides an
Employing experts in administrative
to the dilemma facing the
answer to these questions and a solution
may protest the very constituAmerican legal system. Although some
state is built, most would
tional basis upon which the administrative
of even the strictest of
agree that it is here to stay. The jurisprudence
on the Supreme Court-with the
separation-of-powers originalists
- hasn't challenged the constiexception, maybe, of Justice Thomas235
And although some may protutionality of administrative agencies.
administrative courts employ, most
test the extra-judicial methods that
that the agencies' disinterwould agree that the efficiency advantages
that can be found in the federal
ested experts offer exceeds anything
court system.
agencies are the only solution
I don't suggest that administrative
private adjudication. I suggest
to the expanse separating public from
and their adjudicatory mechanisms
only that administrative agencies
technicalities that characterize
lend themselves to the sort of complex
the schism between private and
cases today and that have precipitated
public law.

that
531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (commenting
235 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n,
jurisprudence
question whether [the] delegation
he would "be willing to address the
of powers).
separation
of
understanding
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